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This paper builds on previous geographical and social science work at the boundaries of climate change by (re)asserting the significance of the territoriality of the national state in global climate negotiations. Using the post-political consensus as a theoretical framework and drawing upon examples from climate change negotiations like Kyoto and Copenhagen, it argues that it is too premature to fetishize the consensus of, and collectivism between, national states in global climate politics. As geographers, ‘territoriality’, both as a material and discursive device, is fundamental in, and constitutive of, how we interpret and understand climate change and the politics thereof.
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I Introduction
The 2009 climate negotiations at the Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen (COP 15) were supposed to build on the Kyoto commitment period (Whalley and Walsh, 2009). Yet they have been widely portrayed as a failure and a disappointment, with the Copenhagen Accord being signed amidst confusion and collusion between the United States and the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) countries (see Porritt, 2009, Bidwai, 2009; Bailey, 2010). More recently at the COP 16 negotiations in Cancun, it was reported that national states took exception to Bolivia’s stance regarding ‘unrealistic’ carbon reduction targets whilst other developing nations from the global South were critical of India and China due to their continual resistance to agree on a legally binding framework at the conference (BBC, 2010). Whilst the negotiations in Cancun were more positive than Copenhagen in terms of outcomes, the political shenanigans of collective global climate negotiations more generally have exemplified the seemingly impossible nature of global climate change politics and sustainability (Swyngedouw, 2007, 2010). 

Concomitantly, such global negotiations seem to have cemented global climate politics firmly in the context of geographic territorial tensions (Vidal and Watts, 2009). Even Ed Miliband, the previous Climate Change and Energy Secretary for the UK (now Leader of the Labour Party), framed the political legacy of the Copenhagen negotiations in territorial terms: ‘Indeed this is one of the straws in the wind for the future: the old order of developed versus developing has been replaced by more interesting alliances’ (Miliband, 2009). This quote suggests that global climate change negotiations have entered an era of Noopolitik (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999), by which any national state, regardless of economic status or power, has a ‘progressive’ consensus-based platform in which to engage in climate change related issues. However, using work on the post-political condition as a theoretical framework, and citing examples from recent global climate change negotiations, this paper argues that national states enact their own territorial interests at global climate negotiations, rather than collectively focusing upon creating a more equitable climate change polity amongst fellow nation states.
 
Swyngedouw’s (2007, 2010) recent work on the post-political condition quite rightly highlights the tension between the popularization of anthropogenic climate change as ‘the enemy’ and the de-politicization of the type of radical, alternative politics that might produce new social, political and environmental futures. Global climate negotiations currently fail to take enough account of the types of politics that coalesce around ‘national’ political scales (see Neumann, 2009). In their own right, global collective politics are ineffective because they are dominated by the territorial interests and practices (e.g. ‘norm-building practices’ (see Jasanoff, 2010: 239)) of the national state, which are, a priori, founded upon an economically-centric view of climate change (Newell and Paterson, 2010; Szerszynski and Urry, 2010).

Following on from this line of argument, this paper suggests how any geographical interpretation(s) of climate change politics need to emphasize the way in which power is territorialized and re-territorialized by the national state. This is contrary to the de-territorialization and de-politicization of the state advocated by the post-political condition, which is built upon the premise that a global collective, ‘populist’ consensus politics has been reached in society with regard to climate change (Swyngedouw, 2007, 2010) where (national state) hegemony is non-existent. I argue how the predilection for the post-political encourages a (non) politics of climate change at the global level, and how this type of polity is paradoxically reinforced through the relational territorial politics of the national state (Beck, 2010). Scrutinizing the territoriality of the national state in the context of the post-political condition seems, therefore, an appropriate way to evaluate whether progress is being made towards Swyngedouw’s newer social, political and environmental futures in the context of anthropogenic climate change, whilst additionally contributing to the emerging debate within human geography and related social sciences that position territory and territoriality as being under-theorized concepts (Ruggie, 1993; Paasi, 2003; Antonsich, 2009; Painter, 2010).

This paper is split into a further five sections. Section II critically examines the post-political condition in relation to the formation of an ‘imagined’ global consensus surrounding the environment and climate change (Swyngedouw, 2007, 2010). It then questions whether a liberal democratic polity, whereby the post-political has its foundation, is actually appropriate in combating such a complex issue as anthropogenic climate change. Section III situates the concept of ‘territoriality’ in a globalized world through the context of the post-political. It introduces a broad set of literatures related to territory and territoriality as a grounding to elucidate how the territoriality of the national state has the capacity to interject global political processes. Section IV shows how the type of climate change politics represented through Kyoto and Copenhagen reinforces the notion of national state territoriality, and how this is counterproductive to the possibility of a consensus post-politics of climate change at the global level. Section V examines the possibility of a politics of climate justice and equity in the context of territoriality. The conclusion summarizes the main arguments of the paper, explaining why it is too premature to talk of a post-political consensus in global climate change politics.


II The post-political condition: an ‘imagined’ consensus in global climate change politics?
The concept of the post-political condition offers an interesting theoretical perspective to explore the global politics of climate change. Theoretically, the concept reduces scientific objectivism (in the form of an all-encompassing Nature) to human subjectivism, particularly in the way that spatially indiscriminate, pragmatic and technocratic human interventions and state management have normalized and popularized environmental problems and anthropogenic climate change within society (Žižek, 1991; Smith, 2008; Swyngedouw, 2007, 2010; Kythreotis, 2010).  This type of interventionist pragmatism can be found in the work of Chantal Mouffe (2005:10), who claims that the political is defined through the decisions that need to be made between ‘conflicting alternatives’. Swyngedouw (2007:25) also suggests that ‘a true political space is always a space of contestation for those who have no name or place’. These ideas suggest that the pragmatic interactions that occur within and between political spaces and territorial borders play a significant role in the (re)production of political structures, e.g., government and governance (Kythreotis, 2010), and subsequently, the ideological constitution of the (national) state. As such, any notion that we are currently experiencing a consensus-based, post-politics of climate change seems pre-emptive. This argument is further consolidated insomuch that high profile global climate negotiations like Kyoto and Copenhagen, whose political success has largely depended upon the consensual acceptance and use of market-based instruments between national states, have been widely portrayed as a failure (Starkey and Anderson, 2005; Prins and Rayner, 2007; Levi, 2009; Bailey, 2010).
 
The current inertias experienced in global climate change politics are interesting because they problematize the post-political condition as representing the ‘end of ideology’. The post-political argues how a political and democratic consensus has been reached in society. Liberal democracy (and capital accumulation) can flourish due to individuality, technical expertise, political pragmatism and a more pronounced shift from government to governance in formal political realms than in previous years. For example, Beck (1992: 154) has previously argued how, through reflexive modernization, ‘destructions of nature can no longer be shifted off into the ‘environment’ either, but as they are universalized by industry, they become social, political, economic and cultural contradictions inherent within the system’. It is this supposed ‘universalization’ which has gradually (and surreptitiously?) eliminated antagonistic political relations between national states (Beck, 1997) and reified the ‘inevitability of capitalism’ (Swyngedouw, 2010). 

However, work supporting the post-political is not without its critics, particularly surrounding how political decisions can in fact be anti-political in terms of their effects (Žižek, 1991, Barry, 2002; Mouffe, 2005). The ‘post-political’ rationale is therefore synonymous with the containment of the true sense of ‘the political’, namely, the right to dissent, the right to argue against a particular consensus, the right to engage in antagonistic relations, the right to be alternative – all facets of what we view, as geographers, to be constitutive of the concept of ‘territoriality’ and pre-emptive of a socially and environmentally just, liberal world. Therefore it is necessary to scrutinize how climate change is a collective global governance action problem in its present form (Adger, 2001; Hulme, 2008a). The immediate threat of anthropogenic climate change has inevitably resulted on the one hand, a broader societal consensus over climate change as a collective, popularized issue. However, on the other hand, it has also heightened the capacity of the individual or groups to influence a broader consensus through practices that are inherently territorial in nature. It is these practices which actually represent a crisis (and paradox) of global climate politics, leading us to question whether we are presently in a post-political age built around the notion of political consensus, reflexive modernization and de-territorialization (Beck, 1994). Beck (2010: 264) has acknowledged this paradox by claiming that ‘industrial modernity has become the victim of its own success’. Beck (2006, 2010) and Hulme (2010) acknowledge the need for ‘cosmopolitanism’ in climate change politics, and to look beyond national state politics coalescing at the international level. Looking ‘beyond’ is problematic because national state interests related to climate change, whether political, economic or a combination of both, have been largely institutionalized at the international level. National state interests are organized through territory and operationalized through territorial practices, so as critical geographers, it is difficult to exactly envisage how national states would be willing to compromise territorial sovereignty in order to pursue a collective global climate change polity based on equity and justice. Yet the post-political condition normalizes the national scale and international arena as the scales for a climate consensus. This is particularly problematic, for as geographers, we cannot disregard the scalar tensions that are constitutive of territoriality.

Swyngedouw (2007: 26–27) also argues that the ‘post-political environmental consensus... is one that is radically reactionary, one that forestalls the articulation of divergent, conflicting, and alternative trajectories of future socio-environmental possibilities and human-human and human-nature articulations and assemblages’. This also suggests that the current period of climate change politics is determined by socio-political solutions that reside solely in international collectivism (Luterbacher and Sprinz, 2001; Howarth and Foxall, 2010), and that by implication, desensitizes localized geographies of scale, hindering potential climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies (Adger et al., 2005). With anthropogenic climate change representative of this era of uncertainty, reaching a ‘consensus’ of consensus climate politics at the global level seems difficult to say the least. Furthermore, is the majority world political system of liberal democracy, through a politics of collective dialogue, best equipped to deal with the uncertainties anthropogenic climate change brings?

In an important critique of the post-political condition, Chantal Mouffe (2005) attempts to answer the above question. She warns of the dangers in accepting liberal rationalism as a form of consensual democratic politics that is omnipresent and infallible. Building on her ideas in the context of climate change, I argue that democratic politics should be based upon the inertias and confrontations within the democratic system, rather than the pursuit of a universal consensus through pragmatism. It is these confrontations which give political democracy its lifeblood. Mouffe (2005: 6) claims, ‘the part played by ‘passions’ in politics reveals that in order to come to terms with ‘the political’, it is not enough for liberal theory to acknowledge the existence of plurality of values and to extol toleration’. Mouffe’s predisposition of plurality and universalism in politics counters the post-political consensus regarding climate change and the environment, which acknowledges that a new breed of ‘life politics’, formed through a dialogic democracy, will eventually lead to a post-territorial and post-anthropogenic climate change world dominated by newer, less adversarial ‘interesting alliances’ advocated by Ed Miliband.

The reality of global climate change politics should be, however, interpreted as a crisis of national scale politics, highlighted most distinctively through the adversarial territorial practices that go on within and between the national state(s). For example, North’s (2010) recent work on ‘immanent’ and ‘intentional’ localisation has shown how there is no ‘cosy’ post-political consensus; climate change is still a deeply political issue. This paper goes a step further, arguing how the adversarial territorial practices that go on within and between national states rearticulates a distinctive climate change politik. Yet paradoxically, one that is not based around agreement and consensus, but rather, it is an era whereby we have no politics of climate change at the global level (Giddens, 2009). 

This is because a (global) politics of climate change is secondary to the economics of climate change (Newell and Paterson, 2010). In territorial terms, this is highlighted, inter alia, through the way in which capital is perpetually fixed, reconfigured and reproduced across space and territory as it seeks new accumulation strategies (Harvey, 1982). The fixing stage of capitalism leaves crystallized socio-political differences and inequities behind (overtly expressed through adversarial and antagonistic territorial politics), which materialise at sub-national scales (Lefebvre, 1978; Brenner, 1998) through the level of experience (Taylor, 1982). This has vast implications for the way climate change is spatially governed because such processes are collectively approached, formed and enacted within spaces based upon rational liberal democracy, (re)producing geometries of power (Massey, 1993), and hindering the types of social capacity building that can engender change on a global scale. Climate change may be a global problem, but the political solution may not actually reside solely at this scale.

With regard to political ‘solutions’ to climate change, Giddens (2009: 4) has argued how ‘we have to work with the institutions that already exist and in ways that respect parliamentary democracy’. Yet conversely, it has been argued that the type of liberal democratic politics currently enacted with respect to climate change is inadequate in solving anthropogenic climate change. Shearman and Smith (2007) argue that a more authoritarian type of political democracy is needed, one that is enshrined in radical democracy where political figures are technically competent experts in the climate field, rather than those who wish to possess power for power’s sake. Other scholars have even suggested that liberal democracy is wholly impractical in combating the uncertainty of climate change. In an interview with a British newspaper, The Guardian, James Lovelock suggested that to combat climate change successfully ‘it may be necessary to put democracy on hold for a while’ (Hickman, 2010). These critiques of liberal democracy suggest that it may be unwise to advocate that a consensus has appeared to have been reached within society in respect to anthropogenic climate change; the sceptics (those that challenge the science of climate change), the gradualists (those that acknowledge anthropogenic climate change, albeit slowly and that economies will be able to adjust and adapt) and the catastrophists (those that critique the sceptics and gradualists and think that change will be sudden and is already locked into the system) are still out there (Szersynski and Urry, 2010, emphasis in original). The consensus-based, post-political condition fails to take full account of the arguments from the sceptics, gradualists and catastrophists. Yet they should actually be encouraged in the spirit of scientific empiricism (Cox, 2010) and Mouffe’s political antagonisms.
 
Swyngedouw (2007: 23) asserts that the way climate change has been approached within western society is where ‘disagreement is allowed, but only with respect to the choice of technologies, the mix of organisational fixes, the details of managerial adjustments, and the urgency of the timing and implementation’. On one hand, society consensually accepts that there is a climate change ‘problem’, whilst on the other hand, society continues to, paradoxically, feed its growth fetish and denies the science of climate change (Hamilton, 2010). This is evidence enough that a post-political climate consensus based on global collective politics is wholly premature. This paradox leaves us with the premise that even ‘questioning the politics of climate change in itself is seen as an act of treachery, as an unlawful activity, banned by ‘Nature’ itself’ (Swyngedouw, 2007: 21). But questioning the spatial repercussions of climate change politics is integral to geography and cognate disciplines (see Hulme, 2008a, b; Bailey, 2008; Aspinall, 2010; Hulme and Mahony, 2010). Thinking of climate change using a social perspective, and moreover, as this paper attempts, in territorial terms, opens up new ways to critique the reality of contemporary climate change politics. This is not to underplay climate denialism, conspiracy theories and the contesting of scientific knowledge surrounding climate change, which all in their own right, suggest there is currently no consensus in global climate change politics. But this paper’s main objective is to demonstrate how geographical debates on territory and territoriality enervate the post-political consensus on climate change.

Using a geographical/social perspective complements the already profound issues prevalent in climate change politics like denialism and the contesting of scientific knowledge. Moreover, it seems necessary in advocating a geographical/social perspective given that a body of research has already suggested uncertainty in how climate change knowledge is constructed solely through the traditional natural sciences (Shackley and Wynne, 1995, 1996; Demeritt, 2001; Stott and Kettleborough, 2002; Schiermeier, 2010). Crossing disciplinary boundaries in researching climate change has been evident in the last decade or so. The examination of institutional resilience to climate change using the lens of social-ecological systems (Levin et al., 1998; Gunderson and Holling, 2002) is but one example of this. Yet still a major chasm exists not only between academia and governments/policy makers generally, but between physical and social disciplines within academia. Sarewitz (2004) even suggested that the broadening out of scientific knowledge worsens environmental crises like climate change through its politicization by particular user groups. In a similar vein, others have emphasized the need to scrutinize how the IPCC construct different knowledge’s, pointing out how knowledge has become disconnected from meaning (Jasanoff, 2010) and how local political and cultural framings of knowledge should be a focal point of future climate research by human and physical geographers alike (Hulme and Malony, 2010). Other geographical work has highlighted the ‘celebritization’ of climate change as a ubiquitous issue within society (Boykoff and Goodman, 2009), whilst Prudham (2009) has insightfully analyzed how such celebritization, through Branson’s $1.6 billion commitment to combating climate change over the next decade, epitomizes the contradictions inherent within green capitalism. All the aforementioned research represents the exciting contribution that geography and other social science disciplines have already made in understanding the politics of climate change as a socio-spatial phenomenon. Such work has also shown how scientific and political expert knowledge is interlinked (Demeritt, 2001) and has been opened up to lay scrutiny (Whitmarsh, 2009; Beck, 2010). If anything, research from geography and cognate disciplines highlight most distinctively, the reality of contemporary global climate negotiations. This reality, in turn, signifies that the notion of the post-political is more ‘imagined’ than material. The next section explores this further by utilizing geographical research that situates the concept of ‘territoriality’ within a globalized, post-political climate change world.

III Situating ‘territoriality’ in a globalized, post-political climate change world 
An ahistorical definition of ‘territory’ could be described simply as a temporal political, economic, social and cultural space bounded by static physical borders, of which such borders uniquely define that space. Yet whilst the concept of ‘national states’ fit cosily within this lay description as a ‘politico-institutional bounded space’ (Antonsich, 2009: 797), geography and other cognate disciplines have attempted to expand on ideas of territory (for extensive reviews see Storey, 2001, and Delaney, 2005). For example, Gottmann (1975) described territory as a link between space, time and politics, a vehicle in which humans organize space to meet their own political aims and objectives. Sack (1983: 56) described territory in areal, categorical terms that ‘most often occur hierarchically and are part of complex hierarchical organizations’. Whilst most notably, Paasi (1998) and Cox (2002) have highlighted, respectively, the roles played by overlapping boundaries and the relational political economy of the state. Such work has moved the territory-territoriality debate forward by situating the discipline’s analytical framework from (national) state-centric narratives of territory to post-modern territorial practices of socio-spatial construction, influence, control, networks and flows.

A seminal, cautionary contribution to the territory-territoriality debate has been provided by Elden (2010: 3) who similarly posited that territory should be viewed in the context of state and space because many definitions of territory are still mistakenly confined to the boundedness of ‘land’ and ‘terrain’. In separating these quite distinct terms, he highlights the additional caveat that territory is intrinsically linked to the historical and geographical contexts – as a ‘political technology’ – from which it has formed. He also warns of the need for geography to distinguish between ‘territory’ and ‘territoriality’ as concepts. More specifically, he argues how territory should be treated with more analytical sophistication, and not just as a precursory straightforward term. Indeed, ‘territoriality’ has been normalized by many current geographical interpretations as the term which best describes a national states’ political dynamism, power and spatiality; yet Elden quite rightly asserts that ‘territory [is] logically prior to territoriality… a concept in its own right’ (2010: 5). With the interdisciplinary aim of this paper to highlight the significance of national state territoriality in global climate negotiations, I acknowledge that territory is equally important as territoriality when studying the political economy of [national] states.

However, many geographers have continued to use the term ‘territoriality’, more so than ‘territory’, when analysing how political process and power is exercised by and within national states. Analysis of the ‘territoriality’ of the national state has largely been contextualised through two key interlinked dimensions: boundaries and sovereignty (for critical discussions of these concepts, see respectively, Newman and Paasi, 1998 and Elden, 2009). Elden (2009) himself has argued how the state possesses sovereign powers which legitimate any decisions it may take. Such sovereign powers are enacted by the state in order to defend its internal borders and extend its influence spatially or externally across space. As such, ‘territoriality’ can be viewed as a bounded concept, for example, through a national state need to maintain its internal characteristics (Waltz, 1979) and to protect its political interests (Taylor, 1995). Yet territoriality can also be a relational concept, for example, in the way a national state aligns its economic interests with other national states who share similar political, economic and social ideologies (Finnemore, 1996). Territoriality is therefore an ontologically fluid and contingent process (Gottman, 1975, Sack, 1983; Ruggie, 1993; Agnew, 1994; Newman and Paasi, 1998; Paasi, 1998; Cox, 2002; Elden, 2010) bound up in notions of overlapping interdependence (Lefebvre, 1978; Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Brenner, 1998). Indeed, exercising territoriality is no longer confined to traditional state practices and boundaries (Paasi, 1998) – just look to the influence of the collective EU in climate negotiations, particularly emissions trading (Vogler and Bretherton, 2006), although as Vogler (2005: 841) notes elsewhere, EU influence is highly contingent upon the effectiveness of the presidential member national state during its leadership period. This suggests that (national state) territoriality and global climate politics are not mutually exclusive entities. Heeding Elden’s (2010) call for the political aspects of territory to be expanded upon, I argue how the post-political fails to fully acknowledge the concept of territoriality (as a geo-political strategy or tactic (see Sack, 1986)) within its ideological rationale.
 
Territorialization and re-territorialization practices, as enacted by and within national states, are integral in shaping the way climate change is governed for globally. Kuehls (1996) has shown how territoriality extends beyond the national state borders of Brazil in terms of carbon sinks and sources. Through his commentary on the atmosphere as a global commons, Vogler (2001) has placed territory-territoriality debate right at the heart of climate politics. He not only highlights the difficulties involved in categorizing territory as bounded, but also shows how the governance of the atmosphere is enshrined in practices that are inherently territorial in nature: ‘Global atmospheric regimes are not simply formal systems of international law. They are social institutions, which rely upon shifting understandings deriving from the interaction of groups and individuals at various levels playing a variety of roles’ (2001: 2428). Global climate change politics are therefore predicated upon territoriality; they are relational, disparate, heterogeneous and contested.

At the sub-national level too, ‘bottom-up’, pragmatic and diverse interventions of agency and power (Newman, 2006; Allen, 2008; Kythreotis and Jonas, forthcoming) have also been identified as playing a key role in determining how wider sustainability and climate change governance is played out across territorial space. So territoriality in the context of global climate change politics is about control and protection of specific identities (Knight, 1982; Paasi, 1998) and economic interests by an array of (economic) actors within and outside of static national borders (Newell and Paterson, 2010). Successful enactment of territorialization in relation to this economic-environmental binary rely on both a sub-national (Newman and Paasi, 1998; While et al., 2009; North, 2010; Rice, 2010) and supra-national (Yamin and Depledge, 2004) politics of state restructuring. However, the national state is often portrayed as the central protagonist in global climate politics, particularly in the context of extending its sovereign powers to improve its economy relative to other national states (Mansfield, 2007) and by being the scale at which the IPCC affects its policies (Rosenzweig et al., 2010). The political wrangling between national states in global collective climate politics represents territoriality in its most powerful guise, epitomizing the binary between nations – the ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Newman, 2006). 

In contrast to this, the post-political environmental ideology is centred upon the notion of a globalized, de-territorialized world, whereby national states are secondary to globalization processes and responsibilities, and ill-equipped to deal with issues like climate change (Beck, 1994; Lacy, 2002). There is no doubt that globalization has transformed the way geographers think about the processes that go on within and between local, national, supra-national and global spaces (see Sassen, 1996, 2006; Waters, 2001), yet it would be naïve to think that one should immediately jettison the importance of national territorialization and re-territorialization practices simply because of the pervasiveness of capitalism through globalization (Brenner, 1998; Yeung, 1998; Cox, 2002; Rudolph, 2005; Paasi, 2009).
 
In terms of neatly packaging a climate change solution at the global level, as represented through the hegemony of the IPCC, we must exercise a great deal of caution. Indeed, some work has shown how cities, for example, are proving a much more fruitful spatial context in which to combat climate change (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Rosenzweig et al., 2010). This is appropriate given that the majority of the world’s population reside in urban conurbations, adding fervour to the notion of a ‘post-national’ world (Appadurai, 2003) where ‘the nation’ is imagined (Anderson, 1991). Yet when thinking of how this translates into instilling a durable global consensus polity over climate change, global negotiations have always been reduced to, and constitutive of, the territorial practices of the national state and the urban spaces they occupy. This suggests that globalization does not supersede territorialization (Elden, 2005). A consensual climate change polity at the global level is unattainable because of the material pervasiveness of national territorial practices. This is best exemplified through the economically and politically-based decisions made at large scale global climate change negotiations like Kyoto and Copenhagen, which shall be discussed next.

IV The power of territoriality (and difference) over a global climate change post-politics
The Kyoto Protocol represented a watershed in global climate politics. Under this agreement, national state interests were to be set aside in favour of political and economic co-operation and consensus between national states in setting targets that would reduce climate change emissions (Breidenich et al., 1999). If there was ever an opportunity to take a path that took heed of intergenerational development and equity as well as cultural differences within global climate change politics, Kyoto would (and should) have exemplified this. The initial intention of the Kyoto Protocol was to produce a global political consensus over climate change. Yet the economic and political means to meet this gargantuan challenge have since been called into question (Nordhaus, 2001; Victor, 2001; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2002; Howarth and Foxall, 2010). Most notoriously, President George Bush Jnr refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, declaring that the price the US economy would pay would be too high, especially since developing countries like India and China would be exempt from the binding emission targets (see BBC, 2005). On the US domestic front, Senate Resolution 98, which strictly reaffirmed the President’s position, epitomized how the territorial politics of the US still holds sway over any meaningful global climate negotiations. 

Domestic Australian climate change adaptation policy has also reinforced the role of national state territorial politics. The recent government position paper, Adapting to Climate Change in Australia (Department of Climate Change, 2010: 4) reads: ‘Australia needs to consider what preparations it might be prudent to take against the possibility that global agreements are less effective’. This suggests that global negotiations are not robust enough to meet the urgent social, environmental and developmental needs stemming from anthropogenic climate change. Howarth and Foxall (2010: 174) are quick to point out how, in the context of Australia, the Kyoto agreement has ‘veiled the structural drivers of Australian emissions’ at national policy level. This suggests that national territorial politics more generally, have an important role to play in their interjection of the global climate change politik.

In Russian domestic policy too, the initial refusal on the part of the Russian national state to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, even though it had a high percentage of surplus emissions rights in the first commitment period, was related to how its mid-future economy would be affected through the non-participation of the US within Kyoto, because Russia anticipated that the US would have bought much of its ‘hot air’ had it participated (Vogt, 2003). Whilst Russia subsequently decided to ratify Kyoto in 2004, it is argued they only did so because the EU promised to back Russia’s bid to join the WTO (BBC, 2004). The refusal of the US to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the influential bargaining power of the supra-national EU (see Vogler and Bretherton, 2006) both exemplify, via complex spatial processes of economic and political rearticulation, the territoriality of the Russian national state. Even the power of the supra-national EU is dependent upon the national territorial politics of its member states (Vogler, 2005). At the global level too, the Kyoto Protocol, although intended to create a consensus climate politics, had national territorialization practices embedded within its legally binding emissions targets for Annex I countries which made ‘allowance for flexibility with respect to parties’ national implementation of their commitments’ (Breidenich et al., 1999: 319).

The negotiations at Copenhagen in late 2009 has further embedded the territorial politics of the national state through, inter alia, the developed nation-developing nation binary, and halted any collective progress in terms of limiting emissions and promoting climate justice and equity. President Obama entered the COP 15 negotiations under a domestic cloud with Congress failing to pass final climate legislation (Samuelson, 2009). This gave further geo-political opportunity to the increasingly powerful BASIC nations to (re)assert their own territorial politics and national accumulation interests over a consensus polity. Jairam Ramesh, the Indian Environment Minister, emphasized how ‘all of India’s concerns had been safeguarded’ (see Andersen, 2009) and China’s Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, amidst alleged UK accusations of hindering emission agreements that would have held a global average temperature increase of 2 degrees Celsius, claimed that the conference had been ‘not a destination, but a new beginning’ (BBC, 2009). This beginning, it seems, is not concerned with the reality of a post-political consensus based upon social and environmental egalitarianism, but one built around the accumulation interests of, and the political antagonisms between, national states. This is a sentiment echoed by Diana Liverman in a recent PiHG book review symposium of Hulme (2009) (Demeritt et al., 2010). Surely then the territorial politics of national states warrants repositioning at the forefront of economic, social, political and cultural interpretations of climate change, despite a trend within human geography and other social sciences that a ‘one territory, one people’ approach has been subordinated to flows, networks and global mobility (Castells, 1996; Antonsich, 2009). Territory should be viewed as relational to, or as an effect of, networks rather than as a theoretical opposite (Jessop et al., 2008; Painter, 2010). The next section explores how territoriality is equally important in laying the foundations of a global climate politics enshrined in justice and equity. 
 
V Attaining a (global) politics of climate justice through territoriality?
Throughout this paper I have argued how national state territoriality is central in understanding contemporary global climate change politics. I have placed particular emphasis on how territoriality is represented and enacted by the accumulation interests of individual national states. On the face of it however, this representation of territoriality, as a material and discursive tactic of the state, conjures negative images of powerful nations wielding economic and political strength over less powerful nations. However, this section concentrates on ways in which national state territoriality can be used to effect change through a different type of territorial politics, one enshrined in climate justice and equity.

Contemporary ontological and epistemological understandings of the human geography discipline are still rooted in the ‘spatial variations’ Ron Johnston expounded in the seminal human geography as explanation debate over 30 years ago (see Johnston, 1980). In the context of this 21st century ‘post-political’ climate change world, ‘territoriality’ as a contextual concept is equally important as ‘spaces of flows’ and ‘networks’. This is especially the case in the development of a global climate change polity based on justice and equity because analyses of national territorial politics highlight the indiscriminate socio-spatial and distributive effects of carbon commoditization (Baranzini et al., 2000; Pearce, 2003). These analyses not only ‘spatialize’ understandings and interpretations of climate change through territoriality, but also, simultaneously, highlight the ethical argument with respect to anthropogenic climate change.

Many commentators have questioned the ethics of global climate change (Gardiner, 2004; Garvey, 2008). More specifically, Caney (2010) has recently questioned the morality of emissions trading, concluding that only if such trading finds new schemes that actually lower emissions and distribute the burdens they impose on poor people more fairly, then trading does have a place in climate change politics. Similarly, Newell and Paterson (2010: 129ff) offer critical insights into the motivations behind economic instruments that control carbon emissions. For example, they highlight how carbon emissions trading and offsets within Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism have been confined to the capital flows of developing countries like India, Brazil and China rather than the more poorer countries in sub-Saharan Africa. They also point out how such projects create ‘carbon colonialism’, with the global South seen as a carbon sink for the North’s carbon source, reproducing inequality between national states (132ff). This not only highlights how adversarial national territorial economic interests still remain at the heart of global political negotiations related to lowering carbon emissions, but shows how market solutions for lowering emissions are difficult to achieve in practice. Any fruitful gains on the global stage with regard to lowering climate emissions needs to be based upon multiple configurations of trust between not only the developed and developing nations but individual national states in their own right (in light of the global Great Crash of 2008, (economic) trust is probably at an all-time low and may be, as intimated by Newell and Paterson (2010: 166), related to the reliance on the market as a solution to carbon emissions post-Kyoto). In addition to this, trust also needs to be developed at a more personal level between the scientists and the politicians more generally (Demeritt, 2001). Achieving this would involve not only a geo-political shift in reasoning via the territorial politics of national states, but also, a cross-cultural, epistemological shift in terms of worldviews and causal beliefs (Parks and Roberts, 2010). Levi (2009: 93) qualifies this by arguing that ‘the core of the global effort to cut emissions will not come from a single global treaty; it will have to be built from the bottom up – through ambitious national policies and creative international cooperation focused on specific opportunities to cut emissions’. This suggests that territoriality, as operationalized through national interests, has to remain at the heart of any collective political negotiations between national states. If carbon is treated as a commodity, as it has done through global climate negotiations like Kyoto and Copenhagen, then we cannot even begin to think of issues of equity and justice before national states have agreed on economic targets that lower emissions.

Parks and Roberts (2010) have suggested that the inertias in global climate politics are resultant of divergent world views which have created particularistic notions of fairness. This is supported by the idea that the uneven distribution of power in the world economy has always been constitutive of national political economies and the lack of convergent interests resulting from such unevenness (O’Hara, 2009). If this is the reality then, global negotiations, according to Giddens (2009), need to be interwoven and constituted by the practices of an ‘enabling’ and ‘ensuring’ state, as well as ‘burden sharing’ amongst national states (Parks and Roberts, 2010). Yet how can an enabling and ensuring state promote global climate justice when at the same time it has to ensure its own economic survival? Surely any social and/or environmental action by a national state (regardless of economic status or geographical position) will also, paradoxically, be an act of territoriality, nullifying any thoughts that we are in a post-political, climate consensus world. Giddens’ (2009) ideas of political and economic convergence may provide a counter to this, which respectively, refer to how efficiently climate policy overlaps with other democratic political values within society and how technical solutions to climate change might produce economic advantage. Yet this western model of democracy, founded upon economic modernization, and reinforced through the institutionalism of the IPCC, is inherently flawed for a global climate change post-politics because such modernization destroys cultures (Mouffe, 2005), reproducing different types of territorial politics across space. It is ironic how current political solutions to climate change have been continually reliant on the economic framework which caused the problem in the first place.

A different sort of (global) politics was intimated earlier, advocated by James Lovelock, to put democracy on hold for a while. This is plausible in the sense that not all the 170 nations that took part in Kyoto have emitted the carbon we are trying to mitigate and now adapt to; in reality only a select few developed nations have the capacity and individual responsibility (Paavola et al., 2006) to alter the earth’s future. It is this idea which has historically positioned global climate politics in terms of territoriality. For example, there is the developed-developing binary, which forms the basis of contemporary global climate change politics. Yet as exemplified in this paper and others (Demeritt et al., 2011: 135) the territoriality of individual national states protecting self-interests suggests that the developed-developing binary is not the only type of territoriality at play that hinders global climate justice. Territoriality (and climate injustice) is therefore inherently scalar and pluralistic, irrespective of a nation’s economic development status (see Walker and Bulkeley, 2006).

The political expediency of global climate negotiations like Kyoto and Copenhagen profoundly highlights the ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Newman, 2006). The territoriality of national states epitomize how a post-political climate consensus on the global stage is currently unachievable and reinforces the (re)production of uneven geographies of development across space. Such unevenness further reinforces the territorial politics that go on between and within national states, as territoriality is the typical geographic manifestation of power, unfolding in the places of our everyday practices and experiences (Massey, 1985). So in what ways can human geography contribute to developing further understandings of climate change, so that more equitable and globally inclusive climate justice becomes the point of collective action between political leaders? Mouffe’s (2009) idea of ‘critique as engagement’ is a useful way forward in the development of a more robust, equitable climate change polity. We do not withdraw from global political institutions in exercising our right to dissent, we engage directly with the existing hegemony through our very own individual practices. An example where many geographers are doing this is through the InCluESEV network (http://incluesev.kcl.ac.uk/). This interdisciplinary network focuses on methods of practically interjecting the climate change political status-quo by giving greater cause to equity and justice issues stemming from the climate and energy vulnerabilities we currently face. It does this by utilizing an international stakeholder network from academia, the public, third and private sectors to engage in the real societal issues brought about by anthropogenic climate change so that climate policy can be directly engaged with, and not merely be informed or consulted upon by policy makers. Another example is the We Act organization (http://weact.org/ (​http:​/​​/​weact.org​/​​)), based in West Harlem, New York. This organization uses ‘critique as engagement’ by holding regional and national educational events and campaigning strategies that seek to embed community justice at the national level of climate change politics. Both of the above examples show how a different type of scalar territorial politics is used as an everyday practice to effect equity, justice and change, rather than being subordinate to national and global political arenas.

VI Conclusion
This paper has shown, by using the post-political condition as a theoretical backdrop, and global negotiations like Kyoto and Copenhagen as an example, how the territoriality of the national state still plays an integral role in shaping global climate change politics. I have argued that if we submit ourselves to a consensual, post-politics of climate change, then we are disregarding the very politics of difference which makes possible a way forward in contributing to solving the societal issues brought about by anthropogenic climate change. Giddens (2010: 58) claimed that through the Copenhagen Accord, we may have ‘inadvertently stumbled’ on a solution to climate change because it ‘recognizes core geopolitical realities’. This paper has shown how such ‘realities’ are inextricably bound up within the territoriality of the national state. The territoriality of the national state is therefore a double-edged sword. On one hand, it reproduces the national accumulation interests that hinder global negotiation as a way forward in global climate politics enshrined in collectivism and consensus. On the other hand, it represents a crisis of politics, through the types of agonistic political interventions (Mouffe, 2005) needed to secure greater climate equity and justice. This is why we have to be wary of claims that we are currently amidst a post-political environmental consensus – climate change is still a highly political subject. The discipline of geography, through the territorialization and re-territorialization practices of the national state, illuminate not only why we cannot talk of a consensus climate politics at the global level, but also highlight the very contradictions that will enable us to engage policy makers and secure particular citizen rights through political spaces of contestation that are intrinsically territorial in nature.
 
So maybe we should think of territoriality (as a socio-political construct within the context of climate change politics) as part of a networked map, whereby different actors assume particular roles in attempting to paradoxically instil the status quo and effect institutional change. This inertia is predicated by humanity’s perception of climate change as representing a ‘black box’ (see Latour, 1987), an issue so complex that we find it difficult to readily resolve or manage systemic climate change issues. This nullifies the possibility of a ‘post-politics’ of climate change at the global level because individuals and therefore, institutions, are in a constant state of social and political flux. Therefore, territoriality, as a theoretical concept and as everyday practice, has to be omnipresent.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Anssi Paasi, University of Oulu, David Gibbs, University of Hull and Tiffany Morrison, University of Queensland, for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. An immense thank you is reserved for Andrew EG Jonas, University of Hull, and the three anonymous reviewers, whose comments proved extremely insightful in developing the core argument of this paper.

References
Adger WN (2001) Scales of governance and environmental justice for adaptation and mitigation of climate change. Journal of International Development 13(7): 921–931.

Adger WN, Arnell NW, and Tompkins EL (2005) Successful adaptation to climate change across scales. Global Environmental Change 15(2): 77–86.

Agnew  (​http:​/​​/​www.sciencedirect.com​/​science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VG2-4J9MSS2-1&_user=891016&_coverDate=05%2F31%2F2006&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=1286454956&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000047400&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=891016&md5=1cd62bf8bfe7b684794ff63c1d34697a" \l "bbib1​)JC (1994) The territorial trap: the geographical assumptions of international relations theory. Review of International Political Economy 1(1): 53–80.

Agnew JC and Corbridge S (1995 (​http:​/​​/​www.sciencedirect.com​/​science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VG2-4J9MSS2-1&_user=891016&_coverDate=05%2F31%2F2006&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=1286454956&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000047400&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=891016&md5=1cd62bf8bfe7b684794ff63c1d34697a" \l "bbib2​)) Mastering space: Hegemony, territory and international political economy. London: Routledge.

Allen J (2008) Pragmatism and power, or the power to make a difference in a radically contingent world. Geoforum 39(4): 1613–1624.

Andersen M (2009) Copenhagen was more than accord. Available at: http://www.denmark.dk/en/menu/Climate-Energy/COP15-Copenhagen-2009/Selected-COP15-news/Copenhagen-was-more-than-the-accord.htm

Anderson B (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London, Verso.

Antonsich M (2009) On territory, the nation-state and the crisis of the hyphen. Progress in Human Geography 33(6): 789–806.

Appadurai A (2003) Sovereignty without territoriality: Notes for a postnational geography. In: Low SM and Lawrence-Zúñiga D (eds) The Anthropology of Space and Place: Locating Culture. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 337–350.

Arquilla J and Ronfeldt D (1999) The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward and American Information Strategy. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.

Aspinall R (2010) Geographical Perspectives on Climate Change. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 100(4): 715–718.

Bailey I (2008) Geographical work at the boundaries of climate policy: a commentary and complement to Mike Hulme. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 33(3): 420–423.

Bailey I (2010) Copenhagen and the new political geographies of climate change. Political Geography 29(3): 127–129.

Baranzani A, Goldemberg J and Speck S (2000) A future for carbon taxes Ecological Economics 32(3): 395–412.

Barry A (2002) The anti-political economy. Economy and Society 31(2): 268–284.

BBC (2004) Russian MPs ratify Kyoto treaty. Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3943727.stm (​http:​/​​/​news.bbc.co.uk​/​1​/​hi​/​world​/​europe​/​3943727.stm​)

BBC (2005) Q&A The Kyoto Protocol. Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4269921.stm (​http:​/​​/​news.bbc.co.uk​/​1​/​hi​/​sci​/​tech​/​4269921.stm​)

BBC (2009) China rejects UK claims it hindered Copenhagen talks. Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8425720.stm (​http:​/​​/​news.bbc.co.uk​/​1​/​hi​/​world​/​asia-pacific​/​8425720.stm​)

BBC (2010) Time to get down to [business] at Cancun. Available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/richardblack/ (​http:​/​​/​www.bbc.co.uk​/​blogs​/​thereporters​/​richardblack​/​​)

Beck U (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage.
Beck U (1994) The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization. In: Beck U, Giddens A and Lash S (eds) Reflexive Modernisation: Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Cambridge, Polity Press: 1–55.

Beck U (1997) The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beck U (2006) Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beck U (2010) Climate for Change, or how to create a Green Modernity? Theory, Culture & Society 27(2–3): 254–266.

Bidwai P (2009) Copenhagen cop out Hindustan Times, 30 December. Available at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/special-news-report/editorial-views-on/Copenhagen-cop-out/Article1-492163.aspx (​http:​/​​/​www.hindustantimes.com​/​special-news-report​/​editorial-views-on​/​Copenhagen-cop-out​/​Article1-492163.aspx​)

Boykoff MT and Goodman MK (2009) Conspicuous redemption? Reflections on the promises and perils of the ‘Celebritization’ of climate change Geoforum 40(3): 395–406.

Breidenich C, Magraw D, Rowley A and Rubin J W (1998) The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The American Journal of International Law 92(2): 315–331.

Brenner N (1998) Between fixity and motion: accumulation, territorial organization and the historical geography of spatial scales. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 16(4) 459–481.

Bulkeley H and Betsill MM (2003) Cities and Climate Change: Urban Sustainability and Global Environmental Governance. New York: Routledge.

Caney S (2010) Markets, Morality and Climate Change: What, if Anything, is Wrong with Emissions Trading? New Political Economy 15(2): 197–224.

Castells M (1996) The Information Age, Vol I: The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell.

Cox HM (2010) What are we doing about climate change? Human Geography 3(1) 1–26.

Cox K (2002) Political Geography: Territory, State and Society. Oxford: Blackwell.

Delaney D (2005) Territory: a short introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
 




Demeritt D, Liverman D and Hulme M (2010) Book review symposium: Hulme M (2009) Why We Disagree about Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction, and Opportunity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 432 pp. Progress in Human Geography 35(1): 132-138.

Department of Climate Change (2010) Adapting to Climate Change in Australia: An Australian Government Position Paper. Barton: Commonwealth of Australia. Available at:
http://www.policy-network.net/uploadedFiles/Articles/Big%20players,%20a%20positive%20Accord.pdf (​http:​/​​/​www.policy-network.net​/​uploadedFiles​/​Articles​/​Big%20players,%20a%20positive%20Accord.pdf​)

Elden S (2005) Missing the point: globalization, deterritorialization and the space of the world. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30(1): 8–19.

Elden S (2009) Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Elden S (2010) Land, terrain and territory. Progress in Human Geography 34(6): 799–817.

OMIT: Featherstone D (2009) Common-sense Beyond the Neo-liberal State. In: Pugh J (ed) What is radical politics today? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 238–246.

Finnemore M (1996) National interests in international society. New York: Cornell University Press.
 
Gardiner SM (2004) Ethics and Global Climate Change. Ethics 114(3): 555–600.
Garvey J (2008) The Ethics of Climate Change: Right or Wrong in a Warming World. London: Continuum.

Giddens A (2009) The Politics of Climate Change. Cambridge: Polity Press. 

Giddens A (2010) Climate Change Meets Geopolitical Reality in Copenhagen. New Perspectives Quarterly 27(2): 58–60.

Gottmann J (1975) The evolution of the concept of territory. Social Science Information 14(3/4): 29–47.

Gunderson LH and Holling CS (2002) Panarchy: understanding transformations in human and natural systems. Washington DC: Island Press.

Hamilton S (2010) The Requiem for a Species: Why we resist the truth about climate change.
London: Earthscan.

Harvey D (1982) The Limits to Capital. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hickman L (2010) James Lovelock: Humans are too stupid to prevent climate change. The Guardian, 30 March. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2010/mar/29/james-lovelock-climate-change

Howarth NAA and Foxall A (2010) The veil of Kyoto and the politics of greenhouse gas emission in Australia. Political Geography 29(3): 167–176.
Hulme M (2008a) Geographical work at the boundaries of climate change. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 33(1): 5–11.

Hulme M (2008b) Governing and adapting to climate. A response to Ian Bailey’s Commentary on ‘Geographical work at the boundaries of climate change’. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 33(3): 424–427.

Hulme M (2009) Why We Disagree about Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction, and Opportunity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hulme M (2010) Cosmopolitan Climates: Hybridity, Foresight and Meaning. Theory, Culture & Society 27(2–3): 267–276.

Hulme M and Mahony M (2010) Climate change: What do we know about the IPCC? Progress in Physical Geography 34(5): 705–718.

Jasanoff S (2010) A New Climate for Society. Theory, Culture & Society 27(2–3): 233–253.

Jessop B, Brenner N and Jones M (2008) Theorizing sociospatial relations. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 26(3): 389–401.

Johnston RJ (1980) Explanation in human geography. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 5(4): 402–412.


Knight DB (1982) Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and
Regionalism. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 72(4): 514–531.

Kuehls T (1996) Beyond sovereign territory: the space of ecopolitics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Kythreotis AP (2010) Local Strategic Partnerships: a panacea for voluntary interest groups to promote local environmental sustainability? The UK context. Sustainable Development 18(3): 187–193.

Kythreotis AP and Jonas AEG (forthcoming) “Scaling sustainability?” How voluntary groups negotiate spaces of sustainability governance in the United Kingdom. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 30.

Lacy MJ (2002) Deconstructing Risk Society. Environmental Politics 11(4): 42–62.

Latour B (1987) Science in Action: how to follow scientists and engineers through society. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Lefebvre H (1978) De I'Etat: Les Contradictions de I'Etat Moderne, Volume 4. Paris: Union Generale d'Editions.

Levi M (2009) Copenhagen's inconvenient truth: how to salvage the climate conference. Foreign Affairs 88(5): 92–103.

Levin S, Barrett S, Aniyar S, Baumol W, Bliss C, Bolin B, Dasgupta P, Ehrlich P, Folke C and & Gren I (1998) Resilience in natural and socioeconomic systems. Environment and Development Economics 3(2): 221–262.

Luterbacher U and Sprinz DF (2001) International Relations and Global Climate Change. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press. 

Mansfield B (2007) Articulation between neoliberal and state-oriented environmental regulation: Fisheries privatization and endangered species protection. Environment and Planning A 39(8): 1926–1942.

Massey D (1985) New Directions in Space. In: Gregory D and Urry J (eds) Social Relations and Spatial Structures.  Basingstoke: Macmillan, 9–19.

Massey D (1993) Power-geometry and a progressive sense of place. In: Bird J, Curtis B, Putnam T, Robertson G and Tickner L (eds) Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change.  London: Routledge, 59–69.

McKibbin WJ and Wilcoxen PJ (2002) The Role of Economics in Climate Change Policy. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(2): 107–129.

Miliband E (2009) The Road from Copenhagen. The Guardian, 20 December. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/20/copenhagen-climate-change-accord (​http:​/​​/​www.guardian.co.uk​/​commentisfree​/​2009​/​dec​/​20​/​copenhagen-climate-change-accord​)

Mouffe C (2005) On the Political. London: Routledge.
Mouffe C (2009) The Importance of Engaging the State. In: Pugh J (ed) What is radical politics today? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 230–237.

Neumann R (2009) Political ecology: theorizing scale. Progress in Human Geography 33(3): 398–406.

Newell P and Paterson M (2010) Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of the Global Economy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Newman D (2006) The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our `borderless' world. Progress in Human Geography 30(2): 143–161.

Newman D and Paasi A (1998) Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world: boundary narratives in political geography. Progress in Human Geography 22(2): 186–207.

Nordhaus WD (2001) After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warming. Available at: http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/PostKyoto_v4.pdf (​http:​/​​/​nordhaus.econ.yale.edu​/​PostKyoto_v4.pdf​)

North P (2010) Eco-localisation as a progressive response to peak oil and climate change – A sympathetic critique. Geoforum 41(4): 585–594.

O’Hara PA (2009) Political economy of climate change, ecological destruction and uneven development. Ecological Economics 69(2): 223–234.

Paasi A (1998) Boundaries as social processes: territoriality in the world of flows. Geopolitics 3(1): 69–88.

Paasi A (2003) Territory. In: Agnew J, Mitchell K and Ó Tuathail G (eds) A companion to political geography. Oxford: Blackwell, 109–122.

Paasi A (2009) Bounded spaces in a ‘borderless world’? Border studies, power, and the anatomy of the territory. Journal of Power 2(2): 213–234.

Paavola J, Adger WN and Huq S (2006) Multifaceted Justice in Adaptation to Climate Change. In: Adger WN, Paavola J, Huq S and Mace MJ (eds) Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change. Cambridge: MIT Press, 264–278.

Painter J (2010) Rethinking Territory. Antipode 42(5): 1090–1118.

Parks BC and Roberts JT (2010) Climate Change, Social Theory and Justice. Theory Culture & Society 27(2–3): 134–166.

Pearce D (2003) The Social Cost of Carbon and its Policy Implications. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 19(3): 362–384.

Porritt J (2009) Selling a low-carbon life just got harder. The Times, 21 December. Available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6963387.ec (​http:​/​​/​www.timesonline.co.uk​/​tol​/​comment​/​columnists​/​guest_contributors​/​article6963387.ece​)e

Prins G and Rayner S (2007) Time to ditch Kyoto. Nature 449: 973–975.

Prudham S 2009 Pimping climate change: Richard Branson, global warming, and the performance of green capitalism. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 41(7): 1594–1613.

Rice JL (2010) Climate, Carbon, and Territory: Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in Seattle in Washington. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 100(4): 929–937.

Rosenzweig C, Solecki W, Hammer S A and Mehrotra S (2010) Cities lead the way in climate-change action. Nature 467: 909–911.

Rudolph C (2005) Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a Global Age. International Studies Review 1(1): 1–20.

Ruggie JG (1993) Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations. International Organization 47(1): 139–174.

Sack RD (1983) Human Territoriality: A Theory. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 73(1): 55–74.

Sack RD (1986) Human territoriality: its theory and history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Samuelsohn J (2009) Obama Negotiates ‘Copenhagen Accord’ With Senate Climate Fight in Mind. New York Times Online, December 21. Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/12/21/21climatewire-obama-negotiates-copenhagen-accord-with-senat-6121.html?scp=1&sq=copenhagen%20accord&st=cse (​http:​/​​/​www.nytimes.com​/​cwire​/​2009​/​12​/​21​/​21climatewire-obama-negotiates-copenhagen-accord-with-senat-6121.html?scp=1&sq=copenhagen%20accord&st=cse​)

Sarewitz D (2004) How science makes environmental controversies worse. Environmental Science & Policy 7(5): 385–403.

Sassen S (1996) Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia University Press.

Sassen S (2006) Territory, authority, rights: from medieval to global assemblages. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Schiermeier Q (2010) The Real Holes in Climate Science. Nature 463: 284–287.

Shackley S and Wynne B 1995 Integrating knowledges for climate change: Pyramids, nets and uncertainties. Global Environmental Change 5(2): 113–126.

Shackley S and Wynne B (1996) Representing Uncertainty in Global Climate Change Science and Policy: Boundary-Ordering Devices and Authority. Science, Technology and Human Values 21(3): 275–302.

Shearman D and Smith JW (2007) The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy. Westport, CT: Praeger.
OMIT: Smith N (1984) Uneven Development. Oxford: Blackwell.

Smith N (2008) Afterword to the Third Edition. In: Smith N (ed) Uneven Development. London: University of Georgia Press.

Starkey R and Anderson K (2005) Domestic tradable quotas: a policy instrument for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from energy use. Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Technical Report 39. 

Stern N (2007) The Economics of Climate Change: the Stern Review. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Storey D (2001) Territory: the claiming of space. Harlow: Pearson.

Stott PA and Kettleborough JA (2002) Origins and estimates of uncertainty in predictions of twenty-first century temperature rise. Nature 416: 723–726.

Swyngedouw E (2007) Impossible “Sustainability” and the Postpolitical Condition. In: Krueger R and Gibbs D (eds) The Sustainable Development Paradox: Urban Political Economy in the United States and Europe. New York: Guildford, 13–40.

Swyngedouw E (2010) Apocalypse Forever? Post-political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change. Theory, Culture & Society 27(2–3): 213–232.

Szerszynski B and Urry J (2010) Changing Climates: Introduction. Theory, Culture & Society 27(2–3): 1–8.

Taylor PJ (1982) A materialist framework for political geography. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 7(1): 15–34.

Taylor PJ (1994) The state as container: territoriality in the modern world-system. Progress in Human Geography 18(2): 151–162.

Victor DG (2001) The collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the struggle to slow global warming. Woodstock: Princeton University Press.

Vidal J and Watts J (2009) Copenhagen closes with weak deal that poor threaten to reject The Guardian, 19 December. Available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/19/copenhagen-closes-weak-deal (​http:​/​​/​www.guardian.co.uk​/​environment​/​2009​/​dec​/​19​/​copenhagen-closes-weak-deal​)

Vogler JF (2001) Future Directions: The atmosphere as a global commons. Atmospheric Environment 35(13): 2427–2428.

Vogler JF (2005) The European contribution to global environmental governance. International Affairs 81(4): 835–850.

Vogler JF and Bretherton C 2006 The European Union as a Protagonist to the United States on Climate Change. International Studies Perspective 7(1): 1–22.

Vogt C (2003) Russia’s Reluctance to Ratify Kyoto: an Economic Analysis. Intereconomics 38(6): 346–349.

Walker G and Bulkeley H (2006) Editorial - Geographies of Environmental Justice. Geoforum 37(5): 655–659.

Waltz KN (1979) Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Waters M (2001) Globalization. London: Routledge.

Whalley J and Walsh S (2009) Bringing the Copenhagen Global Climate Change Negotiations to Conclusion. CESifo Economic Studies 55(2): 255–285.

While J, Jonas AEG and Gibbs D (2009) From sustainable development to carbon control: eco-state restructuring and the politics of urban and regional development. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 35(1): 76–93.

Whitmarsh L (2009) What’s in a name? Commonalities and differences in public understanding of ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’ Public Understanding of Science 18(4): 401–420.

Yamin F and Depledge J (2004) The International Climate Change Regime: A guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yeung H (1998) Capital, State and Space: Contesting the Borderless World. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 23(3): 291–309.

Žižek S (1991) Looking Awry: an introduction to Jacques Lacan through popular culture. Cambridge, MASS: MIT Press.








